Abstract
Firms have an incentive to manage media coverage to influence their stock prices during important corporate events. Using comprehensive data on media coverage and merger negotiations, we find that bidders in stock mergers originate substantially more news stories after the start of merger negotiations, but before the public announcement. This strategy generates a short-lived run-up in bidders' stock prices during the period when the stock exchange ratio is determined, which substantially impacts the takeover price. Our results demonstrate that the timing and content of financial media coverage may be biased by firms seeking to manipulate their stock price.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 241-291 |
Number of pages | 51 |
Journal | Journal of Finance |
Volume | 69 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Feb 2014 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics