TY - GEN
T1 - Vulnerability assessment of large-scale power systems to false data injection attacks
AU - Chu, Zhigang
AU - Zhang, Jiazi
AU - Kosut, Oliver
AU - Sankar, Lalitha
N1 - Funding Information:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. CNS-1449080 and OAC-1934766.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 IEEE.
PY - 2020/11/11
Y1 - 2020/11/11
N2 - This paper studies the vulnerability of large-scale power systems to false data injection (FDI) attacks through their physical consequences. An attacker-defender bi-level linear program (ADBLP) can be used to determine the worst-case consequences of FDI attacks aiming to maximize the physical power flow on a target line. This ADBLP can be transformed into a single-level mixed-integer linear program (MILP), but it is numerically intractable for power systems with a large number of buses and branches. In this paper, a modified Benders' decomposition algorithm is proposed to solve the ADBLP on large power systems without converting it to the MILP. Of more general interest, the proposed algorithm can be used to solve any ADBLP. Vulnerability of the IEEE 118-bus system and the Polish system with 2383 buses to FDI attacks is assessed using the proposed algorithm.
AB - This paper studies the vulnerability of large-scale power systems to false data injection (FDI) attacks through their physical consequences. An attacker-defender bi-level linear program (ADBLP) can be used to determine the worst-case consequences of FDI attacks aiming to maximize the physical power flow on a target line. This ADBLP can be transformed into a single-level mixed-integer linear program (MILP), but it is numerically intractable for power systems with a large number of buses and branches. In this paper, a modified Benders' decomposition algorithm is proposed to solve the ADBLP on large power systems without converting it to the MILP. Of more general interest, the proposed algorithm can be used to solve any ADBLP. Vulnerability of the IEEE 118-bus system and the Polish system with 2383 buses to FDI attacks is assessed using the proposed algorithm.
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U2 - 10.1109/SmartGridComm47815.2020.9302956
DO - 10.1109/SmartGridComm47815.2020.9302956
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85099457178
T3 - 2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2020
BT - 2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2020
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2020
Y2 - 11 November 2020 through 13 November 2020
ER -