Sybil-Proof Online Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsensing

Jian Lin, Ming Li, Dejun Yang, Guoliang Xue

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

34 Scopus citations


Crowdsensing leverages the rapid growth of sensor-embedded smartphones and human mobility for pervasive information collection. To incentivize smartphone users to participate in crowdsensing, many auction-based incentive mechanisms have been proposed for both offline and online scenarios. It has been demonstrated that the Sybil attack may undermine these mechanisms. In a Sybil attack, a user illegitimately pretends multiple identities to gain benefits. Sybil-proof incentive mechanisms have been proposed for the offline scenario. However, the problem of designing Sybil-proof online incentive mechanisms for crowdsensing is still open. Compared to the offline scenario, the online scenario provides users one more dimension of flexibility, i.e., active time, to conduct Sybil attacks, which makes this problem more challenging. In this paper, we design Sybil-proof online incentive mechanisms to deter the Sybil attack for crowdsensing. Depending on users' flexibility on performing their tasks, we investigate both single-minded and multi-minded cases and propose SOS and SOM, respectively. SOS achieves computational efficiency, individual rationality, truthfulness, and Sybil-proofness. SOM achieves individual rationality, truthfulness, and Sybil-proofness. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the performance of SOS and SOM.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationINFOCOM 2018 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)9781538641286
StatePublished - Oct 8 2018
Event2018 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2018 - Honolulu, United States
Duration: Apr 15 2018Apr 19 2018

Publication series

NameProceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
ISSN (Print)0743-166X


Other2018 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2018
Country/TerritoryUnited States

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering


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