Submission costs in risk-taking contests

Mark Whitmeyer

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.014

Submission costs in risk-taking contests

Mark Whitmeyer

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper investigates stochastic continuous time contests with a twist: the designer requires that contest participants incur some cost to submit their entries. When the designer wishes to maximize the (expected) performance of the top performer, a strictly positive submission cost is optimal. When the designer wishes to maximize total (expected) performance, either the highest submission cost or the lowest submission cost is optimal.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	101-112
Number of pages	12
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	142
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.014
State	Published - Nov 2023

Keywords

All-pay contests
Bayesian persuasion
Optimal stopping
Rank-order selection
Stochastic contests
Submission costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.014

Cite this

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title = "Submission costs in risk-taking contests",

abstract = "This paper investigates stochastic continuous time contests with a twist: the designer requires that contest participants incur some cost to submit their entries. When the designer wishes to maximize the (expected) performance of the top performer, a strictly positive submission cost is optimal. When the designer wishes to maximize total (expected) performance, either the highest submission cost or the lowest submission cost is optimal.",

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AB - This paper investigates stochastic continuous time contests with a twist: the designer requires that contest participants incur some cost to submit their entries. When the designer wishes to maximize the (expected) performance of the top performer, a strictly positive submission cost is optimal. When the designer wishes to maximize total (expected) performance, either the highest submission cost or the lowest submission cost is optimal.

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KW - Rank-order selection

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Submission costs in risk-taking contests

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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