Abstract
This paper examines the shareholder wealth effects of bids by controlling shareholders seeking to acquire the remaining minority equity stake in a firm, deals commonly referred to as minority freeze-outs. Minority claimants in freeze-out offers receive an allocation of deal surplus at the bid announcement that exceeds their pro rata claim on the firm. An analysis of bid outcomes and renegotiation indicates that minority claimants and their agents exercise significant bargaining power during freeze-out proposals. Overall, our results suggest that legal standards and economic incentives are sufficient to deter self-dealing by controllers during freeze-out bids.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 681-708 |
Number of pages | 28 |
Journal | Journal of Financial Economics |
Volume | 81 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 1 2006 |
Keywords
- Freeze-out
- Merger
- Squeeze-out
- Tender offer
- Toehold
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
- Strategy and Management