Routing in max-min fair networks: A game theoretic approach

Dejun Yang, Guoliang Xue, Xi Fang, Satyajayant Misra, Jin Zhang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

7 Scopus citations


In this paper, we study the problem of routing in networks with max-min fair congestion control at the link level. The goal of each user is to maximize its own bandwidth by selecting its path. The problem is formulated as a non-cooperative game. We first prove the existence of Nash Equilibria. This is important, because at a Nash Equilibrium (NE), no user has the incentive to change its routing strategy. In addition, we investigate how the selfish behavior of the users may affect the performance of the network as a whole. We next introduce a novel concept of observed available bandwidth on each link. It allows a user to find a path with maximum bandwidth under max-min fair congestion control in polynomial time. We then present a game based algorithm to compute an NE and prove that by following the natural game course the network converges to an NE. Extensive experiments show that the network can converge to an NE in less than 10 iterations and also significantly improves the fairness compared with other algorithms. Our results have the implication for the future routing protocol design.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication18th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols, ICNP'10
Number of pages10
StatePublished - 2010
Event18th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols, ICNP'10 - Kyoto, Japan
Duration: Oct 5 2010Oct 8 2010

Publication series

NameProceedings - International Conference on Network Protocols, ICNP
ISSN (Print)1092-1648


Other18th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols, ICNP'10


  • Max-min fair bandwidth allocation
  • Nash Equilibrium
  • non-cooperative game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Software


Dive into the research topics of 'Routing in max-min fair networks: A game theoretic approach'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this