Retail price fixity as a facilitating mechanism

Timothy Richards, Paul M. Patterson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Scopus citations


Previous theoretical explanations for retail price fixity show that fixed retail prices can be consistent with either competitive or imperfectly competitive behavior. We develop a conceptual model of retail pricing wherein fixed price points are facilitating mechanisms for tacit collusion. A non-cooperative equilibrium in fixed retail prices is supported through credible threats to revert to Nash pricing if cheating is suspected. We test the implications of this model using a two-stage, ordered probit approach in weekly supermarket pricing data. The results show that price fixity does support collusive equilibria among retailers, but other factors may also explain retail price behavior.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)85-102
Number of pages18
JournalAmerican Journal of Agricultural Economics
Issue number1
StatePublished - Feb 2005


  • Collusion
  • Ordered probit
  • Price fixity
  • Repeated game
  • Supermarkets
  • Trigger strategy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'Retail price fixity as a facilitating mechanism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this