TY - GEN
T1 - PhishTime
T2 - 29th USENIX Security Symposium
AU - Oest, Adam
AU - Safaei, Yeganeh
AU - Zhang, Penghui
AU - Wardman, Brad
AU - Tyers, Kevin
AU - Shoshitaishvili, Yan
AU - Doupé, Adam
AU - Ahn, Gail Joon
N1 - Funding Information:
We would like to thank our shepherd, Paul Pearce, and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) under Grant No. 1703644. This work was also partially supported by PayPal, Inc. and a grant from the Center for Cybersecurity and Digital Forensics at Arizona State University.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 by The USENIX Association. All Rights Reserved.
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - Due to their ubiquity in modern web browsers, anti-phishing blacklists are a key defense against large-scale phishing attacks. However, sophistication in phishing websites-such as evasion techniques that seek to defeat these blacklists-continues to grow. Yet, the effectiveness of blacklists against evasive websites is difficult to measure, and there have been no methodical efforts to make and track such measurements, at the ecosystem level, over time. We propose a framework for continuously identifying unmitigated phishing websites in the wild, replicating key aspects of their configuration in a controlled setting, and generating longitudinal experiments to measure the ecosystem's protection. In six experiment deployments over nine months, we systematically launch and report 2,862 new (innocuous) phishing websites to evaluate the performance (speed and coverage) and consistency of blacklists, with the goal of improving them. We show that methodical long-term empirical measurements are an effective strategy for proactively detecting weaknesses in the anti-phishing ecosystem. Through our experiments, we identify and disclose several such weaknesses, including a class of behavior-based JavaScript evasion that blacklists were unable to detect. We find that enhanced protections on mobile devices and the expansion of evidence-based reporting protocols are critical ecosystem improvements that could better protect users against modern phishing attacks, which routinely seek to evade detection infrastructure.
AB - Due to their ubiquity in modern web browsers, anti-phishing blacklists are a key defense against large-scale phishing attacks. However, sophistication in phishing websites-such as evasion techniques that seek to defeat these blacklists-continues to grow. Yet, the effectiveness of blacklists against evasive websites is difficult to measure, and there have been no methodical efforts to make and track such measurements, at the ecosystem level, over time. We propose a framework for continuously identifying unmitigated phishing websites in the wild, replicating key aspects of their configuration in a controlled setting, and generating longitudinal experiments to measure the ecosystem's protection. In six experiment deployments over nine months, we systematically launch and report 2,862 new (innocuous) phishing websites to evaluate the performance (speed and coverage) and consistency of blacklists, with the goal of improving them. We show that methodical long-term empirical measurements are an effective strategy for proactively detecting weaknesses in the anti-phishing ecosystem. Through our experiments, we identify and disclose several such weaknesses, including a class of behavior-based JavaScript evasion that blacklists were unable to detect. We find that enhanced protections on mobile devices and the expansion of evidence-based reporting protocols are critical ecosystem improvements that could better protect users against modern phishing attacks, which routinely seek to evade detection infrastructure.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85091932978&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85091932978&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85091932978
T3 - Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium
SP - 379
EP - 396
BT - Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium
PB - USENIX Association
Y2 - 12 August 2020 through 14 August 2020
ER -