TY - JOUR
T1 - Multi-unit auctions
T2 - A comparison of static and dynamic mechanisms
AU - Manelli, Alejandro
AU - Sefton, Martin
AU - Wilner, Benjamin S.
N1 - Funding Information:
We are grateful to Jorge Aseff for excellent research assistance, to Lawrence Ausubel, Joyce Berg, Robert Forsythe, John Kagel, John List, David Reiley, Thomas Rietz, Rafael Tenorio, and anonymous referees for useful suggestions, to Douglas DeJong for support and assistance with programming issues, to Gary Fethke for support and encouragement, and to Sue Bremner for exacting editorial advice. Financial support from the National Science Foundation under Grant SBR-9810840 is gratefully acknowledged.
PY - 2006/10
Y1 - 2006/10
N2 - We compare, experimentally, the Vickrey auction and an ascending-price auction introduced by Ausubel [Ausubel, L.M., 2004. An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects. American Economic Review 94, 1452-1475], evaluating their performances in multi-unit environments where valuations either have a common-value component or are private information. We observe substantial overbidding, particularly in the Vickrey auction, and find that revenue is higher in the Vickrey auction and efficiency is similar in both auctions. In a further experiment, using slightly different versions that focuses on the common-value component, we observe less overbidding and an apparent trade-off between revenue and efficiency: the Vickrey auction is more efficient while revenues are higher in the Ausubel auction.
AB - We compare, experimentally, the Vickrey auction and an ascending-price auction introduced by Ausubel [Ausubel, L.M., 2004. An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects. American Economic Review 94, 1452-1475], evaluating their performances in multi-unit environments where valuations either have a common-value component or are private information. We observe substantial overbidding, particularly in the Vickrey auction, and find that revenue is higher in the Vickrey auction and efficiency is similar in both auctions. In a further experiment, using slightly different versions that focuses on the common-value component, we observe less overbidding and an apparent trade-off between revenue and efficiency: the Vickrey auction is more efficient while revenues are higher in the Ausubel auction.
KW - Auctions
KW - Experiments
KW - Multi-unit auctions
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.04.014
DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.04.014
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:33749127415
SN - 0167-2681
VL - 61
SP - 304
EP - 323
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
IS - 2
ER -