TY - JOUR
T1 - Later Wittgenstein and the problem of easy knowledge
AU - Scheall, Scott
PY - 2011/7
Y1 - 2011/7
N2 - Traditional epistemologists face a dilemma: either reject KR and confront what Stewart Cohen calls “the Problem of Easy Knowledgeâ€□ or embrace KR and deny that unreflective beings can possess knowledge. In order to avoid this dilemma, an epistemological theory must allow for knowledge on the part of unreflective beings without falling prey to the problem of easy knowledge. I argue that the epistemology of the dying Wittgenstein, presented posthumously in On Certainty, avoids the dilemma.
AB - Traditional epistemologists face a dilemma: either reject KR and confront what Stewart Cohen calls “the Problem of Easy Knowledgeâ€□ or embrace KR and deny that unreflective beings can possess knowledge. In order to avoid this dilemma, an epistemological theory must allow for knowledge on the part of unreflective beings without falling prey to the problem of easy knowledge. I argue that the epistemology of the dying Wittgenstein, presented posthumously in On Certainty, avoids the dilemma.
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U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2010.01421.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2010.01421.x
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:79959670497
SN - 0190-0536
VL - 34
SP - 268
EP - 286
JO - Philosophical Investigations
JF - Philosophical Investigations
IS - 3
ER -