Later Wittgenstein and the problem of easy knowledge

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Traditional epistemologists face a dilemma: either reject KR and confront what Stewart Cohen calls “the Problem of Easy Knowledgeâ€□ or embrace KR and deny that unreflective beings can possess knowledge. In order to avoid this dilemma, an epistemological theory must allow for knowledge on the part of unreflective beings without falling prey to the problem of easy knowledge. I argue that the epistemology of the dying Wittgenstein, presented posthumously in On Certainty, avoids the dilemma.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)268-286
Number of pages19
JournalPhilosophical Investigations
Issue number3
StatePublished - Jul 2011

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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