Is the connectionist notion of subconcepts flawed?

Asim Roy

doi:10.1109/IJCNN.2010.5596954

Is the connectionist notion of subconcepts flawed?

Asim Roy

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

The issue of mental representation of symbols has plagued cognitive science for decades and still doesn't have a resolution. The basic dispute is between the symbol system hypothesis of artificial intelligence, whose proponents include Newell and Simon [1], Newell [2], Smith [3], Fodor and Pylyshyn [4] and others, and Smolensky style connectionism [5] where a "high level" concept or symbol is represented by a number of subconcepts (subsymbols). Both sides claim their representational systems to be at the cognitive level, which means the elements used in their representational systems have meaning. In this paper, we take a closer look at Smolensky style connectionism and find it to be flawed in a number of ways. In particular, the cognitive level subconcepts (subsymbols with meaning) used by Smolensky are inconsistent with a number of principles of human learning. We argue that the subsymbolic distributed representation at the non-cognitive neural layer (McClelland and others [6], [7], [8]) is sufficient to represent a concept or symbol and that an additional layer of cognitive level subconcepts (Smolensky [5]) is redundant.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	2010 IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence, WCCI 2010 - 2010 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, IJCNN 2010
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Print)	9781424469178
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/IJCNN.2010.5596954
State	Published - 2010
Event	2010 6th IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence, WCCI 2010 - 2010 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, IJCNN 2010 - Barcelona, Spain Duration: Jul 18 2010 → Jul 23 2010

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Neural Networks

Other

Other	2010 6th IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence, WCCI 2010 - 2010 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, IJCNN 2010
Country/Territory	Spain
City	Barcelona
Period	7/18/10 → 7/23/10

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Software
Artificial Intelligence

Access to Document

10.1109/IJCNN.2010.5596954

Cite this

Roy, A. (2010). Is the connectionist notion of subconcepts flawed? In 2010 IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence, WCCI 2010 - 2010 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, IJCNN 2010 Article 5596954 (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Neural Networks). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/IJCNN.2010.5596954

Is the connectionist notion of subconcepts flawed? / Roy, Asim.
2010 IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence, WCCI 2010 - 2010 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, IJCNN 2010. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2010. 5596954 (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Neural Networks).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Roy, A 2010, Is the connectionist notion of subconcepts flawed? in 2010 IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence, WCCI 2010 - 2010 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, IJCNN 2010., 5596954, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2010 6th IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence, WCCI 2010 - 2010 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, IJCNN 2010, Barcelona, Spain, 7/18/10. https://doi.org/10.1109/IJCNN.2010.5596954

Roy A. Is the connectionist notion of subconcepts flawed? In 2010 IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence, WCCI 2010 - 2010 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, IJCNN 2010. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2010. 5596954. (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Neural Networks). doi: 10.1109/IJCNN.2010.5596954

@inproceedings{f294e1e45dd84078bfa1d9a634601fa6,

title = "Is the connectionist notion of subconcepts flawed?",

abstract = "The issue of mental representation of symbols has plagued cognitive science for decades and still doesn't have a resolution. The basic dispute is between the symbol system hypothesis of artificial intelligence, whose proponents include Newell and Simon [1], Newell [2], Smith [3], Fodor and Pylyshyn [4] and others, and Smolensky style connectionism [5] where a {"}high level{"} concept or symbol is represented by a number of subconcepts (subsymbols). Both sides claim their representational systems to be at the cognitive level, which means the elements used in their representational systems have meaning. In this paper, we take a closer look at Smolensky style connectionism and find it to be flawed in a number of ways. In particular, the cognitive level subconcepts (subsymbols with meaning) used by Smolensky are inconsistent with a number of principles of human learning. We argue that the subsymbolic distributed representation at the non-cognitive neural layer (McClelland and others [6], [7], [8]) is sufficient to represent a concept or symbol and that an additional layer of cognitive level subconcepts (Smolensky [5]) is redundant.",

author = "Asim Roy",

year = "2010",

doi = "10.1109/IJCNN.2010.5596954",

language = "English (US)",

isbn = "9781424469178",

series = "Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Neural Networks",

publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",

booktitle = "2010 IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence, WCCI 2010 - 2010 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, IJCNN 2010",

note = "2010 6th IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence, WCCI 2010 - 2010 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, IJCNN 2010 ; Conference date: 18-07-2010 Through 23-07-2010",