Abstract
The thesis that the visual system represents objects has garnered empirical support from a variety of sources in recent decades. But what kinds of things qualify as “objects” in the relevant sense? Are they ordinary three-dimensional bodies? Are they the facing surfaces of three-dimensional bodies? I argue that there is no fact of the matter: what we have are equally acceptable ways of assigning extensions to the relevant visual states. The view I defend bears obvious similarities to Quine’s thesis that linguistic reference is inscrutable. Importantly, though, I argue that even if Quine was wrong about inscrutability as a thesis about language and thought, the case for the inscrutability of visual reference remains strong.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 2949-2971 |
Number of pages | 23 |
Journal | Synthese |
Volume | 194 |
Issue number | 8 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Aug 1 2017 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Indeterminacy
- Inscrutability
- Multiple-object tracking
- Perception
- Visual objects
- Visual reference
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy
- General Social Sciences