Increasing performance by minimizing the passing of information

Poor construction performance has resulted in researching procurement process efficiency and overall delivery environment. This paper identifies the maximization of the passing of information as one of the root causes of the poor performance. The hypothesis is validated using several approaches: using deductive logic and the analysis by the Kashiwagi Solution Model (KSM), by associating the relationship between the client's professionals and contractors with the process of outsourcing, quality control, measurement, and the construction industry structure, and ongoing research tests with the US Army Corps of Engineers and US Medical Command (MEDCOM). The hypothesis proposes that as communications between the client's professionals and the contractors increases, the level of accountability, transfer of risk, and the minimization of risk by the contractor decreases. The hypothesis proposes that the amount of information that is being passed, the client's documentation, and the management of the contractor by the client's professionals should be minimized. Furthermore, the hypothesis proposes that this will lead to an increase in the contractor's ability and interests to modify their behavior to perform, to preplan, and to measure their performance. The paper proposes that conventional "best practices" of increasing communications, meetings, extensive client representative documentation, and client construction management and inspection are inefficient, results in less accountability, and lead to an environment with a lack of performance information (measurement of value, customer satisfaction, on-time, onbudget, overall costs, and continuous improvement).