TY - JOUR
T1 - From “Experiments of Concern” to “Groups of Concern”
T2 - Constructing and Containing Citizens in Synthetic Biology
AU - Frow, Emma
N1 - Funding Information:
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The empirical work was funded by a UK Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council Grant (BB/F018746/1). Analysis and writing were supported by the National Science Foundation (Award SES-1058762) and the European Research Council (Award EC 616510, ENLIFE).
Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2017.
Copyright:
Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2020/11/1
Y1 - 2020/11/1
N2 - Synthetic biology represents a recent and explicit attempt to make biology easier to engineer, and through this to open up the design space of genetic engineering to a wider range of practitioners (including, but not limited to, engineers). Proponents of this approach emphasize the standardization of practices as key to successful biological engineering; yet, meaningful transatlantic differences are emerging with respect to the constitution of key concerns and the governance of synthetic biology in the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). In this article, I tease out how national approaches to governing synthetic biology are being framed against different salient past experiences with recombinant DNA technology. In the US, the governance of synthetic biology is consistently articulated in relation to the early days of recombinant DNA technology and the self-governance mechanisms pioneered in response to Asilomar. In the UK, more recent experiences with genetically modified crops provide the overarching imaginary against which governance initiatives are being proposed. I suggest that these differing sociotechnical imaginaries have implications for how new “groups of concern” are being defined in relation to synthetic biology and how measures to contain perceived risks are being pursued in the US and Britain.
AB - Synthetic biology represents a recent and explicit attempt to make biology easier to engineer, and through this to open up the design space of genetic engineering to a wider range of practitioners (including, but not limited to, engineers). Proponents of this approach emphasize the standardization of practices as key to successful biological engineering; yet, meaningful transatlantic differences are emerging with respect to the constitution of key concerns and the governance of synthetic biology in the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). In this article, I tease out how national approaches to governing synthetic biology are being framed against different salient past experiences with recombinant DNA technology. In the US, the governance of synthetic biology is consistently articulated in relation to the early days of recombinant DNA technology and the self-governance mechanisms pioneered in response to Asilomar. In the UK, more recent experiences with genetically modified crops provide the overarching imaginary against which governance initiatives are being proposed. I suggest that these differing sociotechnical imaginaries have implications for how new “groups of concern” are being defined in relation to synthetic biology and how measures to contain perceived risks are being pursued in the US and Britain.
KW - Asilomar
KW - GM crops
KW - biosecurity
KW - containment
KW - public engagement
KW - sociotechnical imaginary
KW - synthetic biology
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U2 - 10.1177/0162243917735382
DO - 10.1177/0162243917735382
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85064104117
SN - 0162-2439
VL - 45
SP - 1038
EP - 1064
JO - Science Technology and Human Values
JF - Science Technology and Human Values
IS - 6
ER -