Founder CEO and agent CEO self-interest

Nathan T. Washburn, Mary Sully De Luque

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution


    In this study, we contrast the perceived self-interested behaviors of agent CEOs with founder CEOs. We also examine the relationship between these perceived CEO behaviors and employee self-interest. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that founder CEOs are more likely to display self-interest, and these behaviors are in turn related to employee self-interest.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationAcademy of Management 2012 Annual Meeting, AOM 2012
    PublisherAcademy of Management
    Number of pages6
    StatePublished - 2012
    Event72nd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2012 - Boston, United States
    Duration: Aug 7 2012Aug 10 2012


    Other72nd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2012
    Country/TerritoryUnited States

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Management of Technology and Innovation
    • Industrial relations
    • Management Information Systems


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