Abstract
This paper presents a new model of political competition in which candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. In doing so, the model provides a unified explanation of two prominent features of public resource allocations: the persistence of (possibly inefficient) policies and the tendency of public spending to favor incumbent party strongholds over swing constituencies.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 242-288 |
| Number of pages | 47 |
| Journal | Journal of Political Economy |
| Volume | 119 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Apr 2011 |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics