English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem

Juan Dubra, Federico Echenique, Alejandro Manelli

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

13 Scopus citations


We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)825-849
Number of pages25
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - Mar 2009


  • Auction theory
  • Global univalence
  • International trade
  • Monotone comparative statics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this