TY - JOUR
T1 - Dynamically engaged smiling predicts cooperation above and beyond average smiling levels
AU - Danvers, Alexander F.
AU - Shiota, Michelle
N1 - Funding Information:
This research was supported by a grant from the John Templeton Foundation to M.N.S. [grant number 23375 ]. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation. The authors extend warm thanks to Claire Yee, Elizabeth Osborne, and the research assistants in the Shiota Psychophysiology Laboratory for Affective Testing at ASU for their rich contributions to data collection and processing. Revisions to this manuscript by the first author were supported by a grant from the John Templeton Foundation to the Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing at The University of Oklahoma. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation, the Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing, or the University of Oklahoma.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2017
PY - 2018/1
Y1 - 2018/1
N2 - Smiling has been conceptualized as a signal of cooperative intent, yet smiles are easy to fake. We suggest that contextually appropriate, dynamically engaged smiling imposes an attentional cost, thereby making engaged smiling a plausible “honest signal” of cooperative intent. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed data from 123 pairs of same-sex strangers having “getting-to-know-you” conversations who subsequently played a one-shot prisoner's dilemma together. We calculated the strength of engagement in smiling using a cross-lagged auto-regressive model for dyadic data. We found that when an individual's partner (the signaler) tended to smile in a more responsive way, that individual (the receiver) was more likely to cooperate. Conversely, when a signaler tended to smile in a less responsive way, the receiver was less likely to cooperate. These effects were present over-and-above the effects of average levels of smiling and self-reported liking, which also predicted likelihood of cooperation. However, dynamically engaged smiling did not predict cooperation on the part of the signaler, suggesting that receivers weight the importance of engagement more highly than they should, or even that engaged smiling might be a manipulative display. These results illustrate how conversational dynamics can influence evolutionary signaling.
AB - Smiling has been conceptualized as a signal of cooperative intent, yet smiles are easy to fake. We suggest that contextually appropriate, dynamically engaged smiling imposes an attentional cost, thereby making engaged smiling a plausible “honest signal” of cooperative intent. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed data from 123 pairs of same-sex strangers having “getting-to-know-you” conversations who subsequently played a one-shot prisoner's dilemma together. We calculated the strength of engagement in smiling using a cross-lagged auto-regressive model for dyadic data. We found that when an individual's partner (the signaler) tended to smile in a more responsive way, that individual (the receiver) was more likely to cooperate. Conversely, when a signaler tended to smile in a less responsive way, the receiver was less likely to cooperate. These effects were present over-and-above the effects of average levels of smiling and self-reported liking, which also predicted likelihood of cooperation. However, dynamically engaged smiling did not predict cooperation on the part of the signaler, suggesting that receivers weight the importance of engagement more highly than they should, or even that engaged smiling might be a manipulative display. These results illustrate how conversational dynamics can influence evolutionary signaling.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85033589824&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85033589824&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2017.10.007
DO - 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2017.10.007
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85033589824
SN - 1090-5138
VL - 39
SP - 112
EP - 119
JO - Evolution and Human Behavior
JF - Evolution and Human Behavior
IS - 1
ER -