Dynamically consistent voting rules

Madhav Chandrasekher

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


This paper studies preference aggregation in a dynamic choice context. Voters face menus of options in stages and the source of dynamics is that menus possibly get smaller across each stage. We call the family of stage voting rules "dynamic voting rules" and provide an axiomatic characterization, on the domain of single-peaked preferences, of dynamic voting rules that are strategy-proof and satisfy a second property, inspired from choice theory, which we call dynamic consistency.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)175-187
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
StatePublished - Dec 1 2015


  • Aggregation of preferences
  • Dynamic consistency
  • Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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