Duality in procurement design

Alejandro Manelli; Daniel R. Vincent

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.11.005

Duality in procurement design

Alejandro Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Finding an optimal mechanism in a standard adverse selection model is equivalent to solving an infinite dimensional linear program. We begin with certain feasible mechanisms-those implemented by auctions, take-it-or-leave-it offers, and combinations of these polar mechanisms-and search for the environments that make them optimal. We prove the optimality of each mechanism using the dual program.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	411-428
Number of pages	18
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	40
Issue number	3-4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.11.005
State	Published - Jun 2004

Keywords

Auctions
Bargaining
Duality
Linear programming
Mechanism design
Procurement

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Applied Mathematics

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10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.11.005

Cite this

@article{90af941407db4284bdc19cd18e3225a2,

title = "Duality in procurement design",

abstract = "Finding an optimal mechanism in a standard adverse selection model is equivalent to solving an infinite dimensional linear program. We begin with certain feasible mechanisms-those implemented by auctions, take-it-or-leave-it offers, and combinations of these polar mechanisms-and search for the environments that make them optimal. We prove the optimality of each mechanism using the dual program.",

keywords = "Auctions, Bargaining, Duality, Linear programming, Mechanism design, Procurement",

author = "Alejandro Manelli and Vincent, {Daniel R.}",

note = "Funding Information: This research was partially supported by NSF grants SES-0095524 and SES-0241373 (Manelli), and SES-0095729 and SES-0241173 (Vincent). The authors are grateful for this support.",

year = "2004",

month = jun,

doi = "10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.11.005",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "40",

pages = "411--428",

journal = "Journal of Mathematical Economics",

issn = "0304-4068",

publisher = "Elsevier",

number = "3-4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Duality in procurement design

AU - Manelli, Alejandro

AU - Vincent, Daniel R.

N1 - Funding Information: This research was partially supported by NSF grants SES-0095524 and SES-0241373 (Manelli), and SES-0095729 and SES-0241173 (Vincent). The authors are grateful for this support.

PY - 2004/6

Y1 - 2004/6

N2 - Finding an optimal mechanism in a standard adverse selection model is equivalent to solving an infinite dimensional linear program. We begin with certain feasible mechanisms-those implemented by auctions, take-it-or-leave-it offers, and combinations of these polar mechanisms-and search for the environments that make them optimal. We prove the optimality of each mechanism using the dual program.

AB - Finding an optimal mechanism in a standard adverse selection model is equivalent to solving an infinite dimensional linear program. We begin with certain feasible mechanisms-those implemented by auctions, take-it-or-leave-it offers, and combinations of these polar mechanisms-and search for the environments that make them optimal. We prove the optimality of each mechanism using the dual program.

KW - Auctions

KW - Bargaining

KW - Duality

KW - Linear programming

KW - Mechanism design

KW - Procurement

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=1842449648&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=1842449648&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.11.005

DO - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.11.005

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:1842449648

SN - 0304-4068

VL - 40

SP - 411

EP - 428

JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics

IS - 3-4

ER -

Duality in procurement design

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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