Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities

Łukasz Balbus, Paweł Dziewulski, Kevin Reffett, Łukasz Woźny

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

9 Scopus citations


We study equilibrium in large games of strategic complementarities (GSC) with differential information. We define an appropriate notion of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium and prove its existence. Furthermore, we characterize order-theoretic properties of the equilibrium set, provide monotone comparative statics for ordered perturbations of the space of games, and provide explicit algorithms for computing extremal equilibria. We complement the paper with new results on the existence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the sense of Balder and Rustichini (J Econ Theory 62(2):385–393, 1994) or Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77(2):330–353, 1997) for large GSC and provide an analogous characterization of the equilibrium set as in the case of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Finally, we apply our results to riot games, beauty contests, and common value auctions. In all cases, standard existence and comparative statics tools in the theory of supermodular games for finite numbers of agents do not apply in general, and new constructions are required.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)201-243
Number of pages43
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - May 28 2015


  • Aggregating the single-crossing property
  • Computation
  • Differential information
  • Distributional equilibria
  • Large games
  • Supermodular games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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