TY - GEN
T1 - Cumulonimbus
T2 - 2022 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2022
AU - Zhang, Yuhui
AU - Yang, Dejun
AU - Xue, Guoliang
N1 - Funding Information:
Zhang and Yang are affiliated with Colorado School of Mines, Golden, CO 80401. Xue is affiliated with Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287. Email:{yuhzhang, djyang}@mines.edu, xue@asu.edu. This research was supported in part by NSF grants 2007083 and 2008935. The information reported here does not reflect the position or the policy of the federal government.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 IEEE.
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - Payment channel networks (PCNs) are proposed to improve the cryptocurrency scalability by settling off-chain transactions. However, a significant barrier is that a PCN user must solicit sufficient capital owned by the counterparty on its channel (i.e., inbound liquidity) to receive payments. To alleviate this inbound liquidity problem, Channel Liquidity Marketplaces (CLMs), e.g., Bitcoin's Lightning Pool, have been introduced, such that users can buy and sell inbound liquidity by trading crypto capital commitment in PCNs. Existing CLMs lack good incentive mechanisms that can attract more user participation. To fulfill this void, we design Cumulonimbus, an incentive mechanism for trading crypto capital commitment, which satisfies truthfulness, individual rationality, budget balance, and computational efficiency. Particularly, Cumulonimbus considers two unique features of crypto capital commitment, referred to as demand indivisibility and supply divisibility. Extensive simulations demonstrate that Cumulonimbus achieves higher satisfaction ratio, liquidity utilization, and social welfare compared with a state-of-the-art CLM mechanism Lightning Pool [18].
AB - Payment channel networks (PCNs) are proposed to improve the cryptocurrency scalability by settling off-chain transactions. However, a significant barrier is that a PCN user must solicit sufficient capital owned by the counterparty on its channel (i.e., inbound liquidity) to receive payments. To alleviate this inbound liquidity problem, Channel Liquidity Marketplaces (CLMs), e.g., Bitcoin's Lightning Pool, have been introduced, such that users can buy and sell inbound liquidity by trading crypto capital commitment in PCNs. Existing CLMs lack good incentive mechanisms that can attract more user participation. To fulfill this void, we design Cumulonimbus, an incentive mechanism for trading crypto capital commitment, which satisfies truthfulness, individual rationality, budget balance, and computational efficiency. Particularly, Cumulonimbus considers two unique features of crypto capital commitment, referred to as demand indivisibility and supply divisibility. Extensive simulations demonstrate that Cumulonimbus achieves higher satisfaction ratio, liquidity utilization, and social welfare compared with a state-of-the-art CLM mechanism Lightning Pool [18].
KW - blockchain
KW - Cryptocurrency
KW - incentive mechanism
KW - payment channel network
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85137260026&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85137260026&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ICC45855.2022.9838590
DO - 10.1109/ICC45855.2022.9838590
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85137260026
T3 - IEEE International Conference on Communications
SP - 5621
EP - 5626
BT - ICC 2022 - IEEE International Conference on Communications
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 16 May 2022 through 20 May 2022
ER -