Abstract
Boards of directors serve two important functions for organizations: monitoring management on behalf of shareholders and providing resources. Agency theorists assert that effective monitoring is a function of a board's incentives, whereas resource dependence theorists contend that the provision of resources is a function of board capital. We combine the two perspectives and argue that board capital affects both board monitoring and the provision of resources and that board incentives moderate these relationships.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 383-396 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | Academy of Management Review |
Volume | 28 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jul 2003 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Business, Management and Accounting
- Strategy and Management
- Management of Technology and Innovation