TY - GEN
T1 - Attacks only get better
T2 - 38th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Eurocrypt 2019
AU - Hoang, Viet Tung
AU - Miller, David
AU - Trieu, Ni
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank anonymous reviewers of EUROCRYPT 2019 for insightful feedback. Viet Tung Hoang was supported by NSF grants CICI-1738912 and CRII-1755539. Ni Trieu was supported by NSF award #1617197.
Funding Information:
Acknowledgments. We thank anonymous reviewers of EUROCRYPT 2019 for insightful feedback. Viet Tung Hoang was supported by NSF grants CICI-1738912 and CRII-1755539. Ni Trieu was supported by NSF award #1617197.
Publisher Copyright:
© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2019.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - We improve the attack of Durak and Vaudenay (CRYPTO’17) on NIST Format-Preserving Encryption standard FF3, reducing the running time from O(N5) to O(N17 / 6) for domain ZN× ZN. Concretely, DV’s attack needs about 2 50 operations to recover encrypted 6-digit PINs, whereas ours only spends about 2 30 operations. In realizing this goal, we provide a pedagogical example of how to use distinguishing attacks to speed up slide attacks. In addition, we improve the running time of DV’s known-plaintext attack on 4-round Feistel of domain ZN× ZN from O(N3) time to just O(N5 / 3) time. We also generalize our attacks to a general domain ZM× ZN, allowing one to recover encrypted SSNs using about 2 50 operations. Finally, we provide some proof-of-concept implementations to empirically validate our results.
AB - We improve the attack of Durak and Vaudenay (CRYPTO’17) on NIST Format-Preserving Encryption standard FF3, reducing the running time from O(N5) to O(N17 / 6) for domain ZN× ZN. Concretely, DV’s attack needs about 2 50 operations to recover encrypted 6-digit PINs, whereas ours only spends about 2 30 operations. In realizing this goal, we provide a pedagogical example of how to use distinguishing attacks to speed up slide attacks. In addition, we improve the running time of DV’s known-plaintext attack on 4-round Feistel of domain ZN× ZN from O(N3) time to just O(N5 / 3) time. We also generalize our attacks to a general domain ZM× ZN, allowing one to recover encrypted SSNs using about 2 50 operations. Finally, we provide some proof-of-concept implementations to empirically validate our results.
KW - Attacks
KW - Format-Preserving Encryption
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85065887241&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85065887241&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-17656-3_4
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-17656-3_4
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85065887241
SN - 9783030176556
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 85
EP - 116
BT - Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2019 - 38th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings
A2 - Rijmen, Vincent
A2 - Ishai, Yuval
PB - Springer Verlag
Y2 - 19 May 2019 through 23 May 2019
ER -