TY - JOUR
T1 - An examination of the effects of managerial procedural safeguards, managerial likeability, and type of fraudulent act on intentions to report fraud to a manager
AU - Kaplan, Steven
AU - Pope, Kelly R.
AU - Samuels, Janet A.
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - Only a fraction of employees who discover fraud report this information. Given the serious consequences of fraud, better understanding factors influencing individuals’ intentions to report fraud, particularly to a non-anonymous recipient such as a manager, is important. We predict that reporting intentions to a manager will be influenced by attributes of the firm (e.g., whether managerial procedural safeguards are strong or weak), the report recipient (e.g., whether the manager is likeable or unlikeable), and the type of fraud (e.g., misappropriation of assets or fraudulent financial reporting). Results from this experimental study indicate that managerial likeability and the type of fraud, but not managerial procedural safeguards or the interaction with managerial likeability, significantly influence reporting intentions to a manager. We contend that participants are influenced by managerial likeability because it provides specific information about the manager and acts as a signal about how the manager will likely handle a fraud report. These results, consistent with previous research (Robinson, Robertson, and Curtis 2012), suggest that participants make stronger attributions to a person engaging in misappropriation of assets compared to a person engaging in fraudulent financial reporting. Implications of this study to the practitioner and academic communities are discussed.
AB - Only a fraction of employees who discover fraud report this information. Given the serious consequences of fraud, better understanding factors influencing individuals’ intentions to report fraud, particularly to a non-anonymous recipient such as a manager, is important. We predict that reporting intentions to a manager will be influenced by attributes of the firm (e.g., whether managerial procedural safeguards are strong or weak), the report recipient (e.g., whether the manager is likeable or unlikeable), and the type of fraud (e.g., misappropriation of assets or fraudulent financial reporting). Results from this experimental study indicate that managerial likeability and the type of fraud, but not managerial procedural safeguards or the interaction with managerial likeability, significantly influence reporting intentions to a manager. We contend that participants are influenced by managerial likeability because it provides specific information about the manager and acts as a signal about how the manager will likely handle a fraud report. These results, consistent with previous research (Robinson, Robertson, and Curtis 2012), suggest that participants make stronger attributions to a person engaging in misappropriation of assets compared to a person engaging in fraudulent financial reporting. Implications of this study to the practitioner and academic communities are discussed.
KW - Fraud
KW - Managerial likeability
KW - Managerial procedural safeguards
KW - Reporting intentions
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U2 - 10.2308/bria-51126
DO - 10.2308/bria-51126
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84947724512
SN - 1050-4753
VL - 27
SP - 77
EP - 94
JO - Behavioral Research in Accounting
JF - Behavioral Research in Accounting
IS - 2
ER -