TY - JOUR
T1 - Against weatherson on how to frame a decision problem
AU - Blackson, Thomas
PY - 2016/1/1
Y1 - 2016/1/1
N2 - In "Knowledge, Bets, and Interests," Brian Weatherson makes a suggestion for how to frame a decision problem. He argues that "the states we can 'leave off' a decision table are the states that the agent knows not to obtain." I present and defend an example that shows that Weatherson's principle is false. Weatherson is correct to think that some intuitively rational decisions wouldn't be rational if states the agent knows not to obtain were not omitted from the outcomes in the decision problem. This, however, is not true of every rational decision. Weatherson's principle for how to frame a decision problem is open to counterexample.
AB - In "Knowledge, Bets, and Interests," Brian Weatherson makes a suggestion for how to frame a decision problem. He argues that "the states we can 'leave off' a decision table are the states that the agent knows not to obtain." I present and defend an example that shows that Weatherson's principle is false. Weatherson is correct to think that some intuitively rational decisions wouldn't be rational if states the agent knows not to obtain were not omitted from the outcomes in the decision problem. This, however, is not true of every rational decision. Weatherson's principle for how to frame a decision problem is open to counterexample.
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U2 - 10.5840/jpr201662868
DO - 10.5840/jpr201662868
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85049144742
SN - 1053-8364
VL - 41
SP - 69
EP - 72
JO - Journal of Philosophical Research
JF - Journal of Philosophical Research
ER -