Abstract
The legal scholar Henry Wigmore asserted that cross-examination is ‘the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.’ Was Wigmore right? Instead of addressing this question upfront, this paper offers a conceptual ground clearing. It is difficult to say whether Wigmore was right or wrong without becoming clear about what we mean by cross-examination; how it operates at trial; what it is intended to accomplish. Despite the growing importance of legal epistemology, there is virtually no philosophical work that discusses cross-examination, its scope and function at trial. This paper makes a first attempt at clearing the ground by articulating an analysis of cross-examination using probability theory and Bayesian networks. This analysis relies on the distinction between undercutting and rebutting evidence. A preliminary assessment of the truth-seeking function of cross-examination is offered at the end of the paper.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 41-65 |
Number of pages | 25 |
Journal | Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Issues |
Volume | 31 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Oct 2021 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy