Why Lewis’ appeal to natural properties fails to Kripke’s rule-following paradox

Carla Merino-Rajme

doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0282-3

Why Lewis’ appeal to natural properties fails to Kripke’s rule-following paradox

Carla Merino-Rajme

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

I consider Lewis’ appeal to naturalness to solve Kripke’s rule-following paradox. I then present a different interpretation of this paradox and offer reasons for thinking that this is what Kripke had in mind. I argue that Lewis’ proposal cannot provide a solution to this version of paradox.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	163-175
Number of pages	13
Journal	Philosophical Studies
Volume	172
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0282-3
State	Published - 2015
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Kripke
Lewis
Meaning intentions
Natural properties
Rule following
Rule following paradox

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy

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10.1007/s11098-014-0282-3

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abstract = "I consider Lewis{\textquoteright} appeal to naturalness to solve Kripke{\textquoteright}s rule-following paradox. I then present a different interpretation of this paradox and offer reasons for thinking that this is what Kripke had in mind. I argue that Lewis{\textquoteright} proposal cannot provide a solution to this version of paradox.",

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Why Lewis’ appeal to natural properties fails to Kripke’s rule-following paradox

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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