Why Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology has no luck with closure

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In Part I, this paper argues that Duncan Pritchard's version of safety is incompatible with closure. In Part II I argue for an alternative theory that fares much better. Part I begins by reviewing past arguments concerning safety's problems with closure. After discussing both their inadequacies and Pritchard's response to them, I offer a modified criticism immune to previous shortcomings. I conclude Part I by explaining how Pritchard's own arguments make my critique possible. Part II argues that most modal theories of knowledge will run into problems similar to those found in Pritchard's Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology. I hence offer my own theory grounded in risk assessment and explain why and how it does much better.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)493-515
Number of pages23
JournalLogos and Episteme
Issue number4
StatePublished - Dec 1 2017
Externally publishedYes


  • Barns
  • Closure
  • Risk. Edmund Gettier
  • Safety

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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