The donation paradox for peremptory challenges

Joseph B. Kadane, Christopher A. Stone, Garrick Wallstrom

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Scopus citations


A donation paradox occurs when a player gives an apparently valuable prerogative to another player, but 'does better', according to some criterion. Peremptory challenges, used in choosing a American jury, permit each side to veto a certain number of potential jurors. With even a very simple model of jury selection, it is shown that for one side to give a peremptory challenge to the other side may lead to a more favorable jury, an instance of the donation paradox. Both a theorem and examples are given concerning the existence of the donation paradox in the optimal use of peremptory challenges.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)139-155
Number of pages17
JournalTheory and Decision
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1999
Externally publishedYes


  • Backwards induction
  • Candidate types
  • Donation paradox
  • Jury
  • Power
  • Sequential decision

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Decision Sciences
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Applied Psychology
  • General Social Sciences
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Computer Science Applications


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