Optimal transmission power control in the presence of a smart jammer

Dejun Yang; Jin Zhang; Xi Fang; Andrea Richa; Guoliang Xue

doi:10.1109/GLOCOM.2012.6503997

Optimal transmission power control in the presence of a smart jammer

Dejun Yang, Jin Zhang, Xi Fang, Andrea Richa, Guoliang Xue

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

40 Scopus citations

Abstract

Jamming defense is an important yet challenging problem. In this paper, we study the jamming defense problem in the presence of a smart jammer, who can quickly learn the transmission power of the user and adaptively adjust its transmission power to maximize the damaging effect. By modeling the problem as a Stackelberg game, we compute the optimal transmission power for the user to maximize its utility, in spite of the existence of the smart jammer. We prove that the smart jammer is not more damaging than a jammer without the intelligence, provided that the user plays its strategy corresponding to a Stackelberg equilibrium. This nice property is due to the user's ability to predict the jammer's behavior.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	2012 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2012
Pages	5506-5511
Number of pages	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2012.6503997
State	Published - Dec 1 2012
Event	2012 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2012 - Anaheim, CA, United States Duration: Dec 3 2012 → Dec 7 2012

Publication series

Name	GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference

Other

Other	2012 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2012
Country/Territory	United States
City	Anaheim, CA
Period	12/3/12 → 12/7/12

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Access to Document

10.1109/GLOCOM.2012.6503997

Cite this

Yang, D, Zhang, J, Fang, X, Richa, A & Xue, G 2012, Optimal transmission power control in the presence of a smart jammer. in 2012 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2012., 6503997, GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, pp. 5506-5511, 2012 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2012, Anaheim, CA, United States, 12/3/12. https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2012.6503997

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abstract = "Jamming defense is an important yet challenging problem. In this paper, we study the jamming defense problem in the presence of a smart jammer, who can quickly learn the transmission power of the user and adaptively adjust its transmission power to maximize the damaging effect. By modeling the problem as a Stackelberg game, we compute the optimal transmission power for the user to maximize its utility, in spite of the existence of the smart jammer. We prove that the smart jammer is not more damaging than a jammer without the intelligence, provided that the user plays its strategy corresponding to a Stackelberg equilibrium. This nice property is due to the user's ability to predict the jammer's behavior.",

author = "Dejun Yang and Jin Zhang and Xi Fang and Andrea Richa and Guoliang Xue",

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Optimal transmission power control in the presence of a smart jammer

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