Misprocurement and public performance in Cambodia: reflections on reform and resistance

Misprocurement and procurement dysfunction remain persistent barriers to effective public performance in Cambodia. Despite successive waves of formal procurement reform and anti-corruption initiatives, the gap between rules on paper and practices on the ground remains wide. Drawing on long-term engagement with aid, governance, and reform in Cambodia, this article examines how procurement irregularities—from donor-financed project scandals to routine malpractices—undermine service delivery, fiscal efficiency, and public trust. The analysis situates Cambodia’s experience within a broader set of low-accountability, aid-dependent governance environments, while using Cambodia as a detailed case to illustrate how weak enforcement, misaligned incentives, and limited institutional protection for officials constrain reform outcomes. The discussion integrates empirical evidence with reflective analysis honoring Steve Kelman’s contributions to procurement reform, public performance, and public integrity. Particular attention is given to the role of international donors, who have often served as the primary source of procurement accountability, while also underscoring the limits of externally driven reform in the absence of domestic institutional change. The article concludes with lessons for public management reform that emphasize aligning technical procurement fixes with political leadership, organizational incentives, and credible accountability mechanisms, especially in politically constrained administrative systems facing ­persistent implementation and oversight challenges.