Abstract
This study explores the consequences of legislative turnover for the hiring of lobbyists and influence of interest groups. We argue that lobbyists develop durable relationships with lawmakers in assemblies with low turnover. Such relationships allow lobbyists to attract clients. We use a new, state-level measure of multi-client lobbying to show that legislative turnover and multi-client lobbying are inversely related: decreases in turnover are correlated with more multi-client lobbying. In a second set of analyses, we find that legislative term limits are associated with less multi-client lobbying. Since multi-client lobbying poses risks to the representation of individual interests and magnifies the effects of resource differences between interests, our results suggest that turnover may help more diverse interests to achieve political influence.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 746-762 |
Number of pages | 17 |
Journal | Political Science Research and Methods |
Volume | 11 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Oct 1 2023 |
Keywords
- American politics
- intergovernmental politics
- legislative politics
- political parties and interest groups
- state
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Political Science and International Relations