K Street on main: Legislative turnover and multi-client lobbying

James M. Strickland, Jesse M. Crosson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


This study explores the consequences of legislative turnover for the hiring of lobbyists and influence of interest groups. We argue that lobbyists develop durable relationships with lawmakers in assemblies with low turnover. Such relationships allow lobbyists to attract clients. We use a new, state-level measure of multi-client lobbying to show that legislative turnover and multi-client lobbying are inversely related: decreases in turnover are correlated with more multi-client lobbying. In a second set of analyses, we find that legislative term limits are associated with less multi-client lobbying. Since multi-client lobbying poses risks to the representation of individual interests and magnifies the effects of resource differences between interests, our results suggest that turnover may help more diverse interests to achieve political influence.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalPolitical Science Research and Methods
StateAccepted/In press - 2022


  • American politics
  • legislative politics
  • political parties and interest groups
  • state and intergovernmental politics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations


Dive into the research topics of 'K Street on main: Legislative turnover and multi-client lobbying'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this