TY - JOUR
T1 - Intertemporal Cournot and Walras equilibria
T2 - An illustration
AU - Cordella, Tito
AU - Datta, Manjira
PY - 2002/1/1
Y1 - 2002/1/1
N2 - In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an inefficiency that does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number of strategic Cournot agents implies that the amount of trade (relative to their aggregate consumption) increases (i.e., it moves towards the Walrasian amount), but their investment (relative to the stock) decreases (i.e., it moves away from the Walrasian amount).
AB - In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an inefficiency that does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number of strategic Cournot agents implies that the amount of trade (relative to their aggregate consumption) increases (i.e., it moves towards the Walrasian amount), but their investment (relative to the stock) decreases (i.e., it moves away from the Walrasian amount).
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U2 - 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00006
DO - 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00006
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0036047798
SN - 0020-6598
VL - 43
SP - 137
EP - 153
JO - International Economic Review
JF - International Economic Review
IS - 1
ER -