Implementation of unobservable state-preserving topology attacks

Jiazi Zhang; Lalitha Sankar

doi:10.1109/NAPS.2015.7335175

Implementation of unobservable state-preserving topology attacks

Jiazi Zhang
, Lalitha Sankar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

13 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper studies the vulnerability of AC state estimation (SE) with respect to a class of unobservable state-preserving topology attacks, in which the topology data are changed by attacker while the states remain unchanged. An algorithm based on breadth-first search (BFS) is developed to determine the subset of topology data and measurements required to launch successful unobservable state-preserving topology attacks. It is shown that the proposed algorithm can enable an attacker to obtain the localized topology and corresponding measurement data to mount an attack that bypasses bad data detector and successfully changes topology information of the system in the cyber layer.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	2015 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2015
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)	9781467373890
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/NAPS.2015.7335175
State	Published - Nov 20 2015
Event	North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2015 - Charlotte, United States Duration: Oct 4 2015 → Oct 6 2015

Publication series

Name	2015 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2015

Other

Other	North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2015
Country/Territory	United States
City	Charlotte
Period	10/4/15 → 10/6/15

Keywords

Cyber physical system security
breadth-first search
power system state and topology estimation
topology attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Energy Engineering and Power Technology
Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Control and Systems Engineering

Access to Document

10.1109/NAPS.2015.7335175

Cite this

Zhang, J & Sankar, L 2015, Implementation of unobservable state-preserving topology attacks. in 2015 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2015., 7335175, 2015 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2015, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2015, Charlotte, United States, 10/4/15. https://doi.org/10.1109/NAPS.2015.7335175

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title = "Implementation of unobservable state-preserving topology attacks",

abstract = "This paper studies the vulnerability of AC state estimation (SE) with respect to a class of unobservable state-preserving topology attacks, in which the topology data are changed by attacker while the states remain unchanged. An algorithm based on breadth-first search (BFS) is developed to determine the subset of topology data and measurements required to launch successful unobservable state-preserving topology attacks. It is shown that the proposed algorithm can enable an attacker to obtain the localized topology and corresponding measurement data to mount an attack that bypasses bad data detector and successfully changes topology information of the system in the cyber layer.",

keywords = "Cyber physical system security, breadth-first search, power system state and topology estimation, topology attack",

author = "Jiazi Zhang and Lalitha Sankar",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2015 IEEE.; North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2015 ; Conference date: 04-10-2015 Through 06-10-2015",

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AB - This paper studies the vulnerability of AC state estimation (SE) with respect to a class of unobservable state-preserving topology attacks, in which the topology data are changed by attacker while the states remain unchanged. An algorithm based on breadth-first search (BFS) is developed to determine the subset of topology data and measurements required to launch successful unobservable state-preserving topology attacks. It is shown that the proposed algorithm can enable an attacker to obtain the localized topology and corresponding measurement data to mount an attack that bypasses bad data detector and successfully changes topology information of the system in the cyber layer.

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KW - breadth-first search

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KW - topology attack

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M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:84961801442

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BT - 2015 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2015

PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

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Y2 - 4 October 2015 through 6 October 2015

ER -

Implementation of unobservable state-preserving topology attacks

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Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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