Implementation of unobservable state-preserving topology attacks

Jiazi Zhang, Lalitha Sankar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

13 Scopus citations


This paper studies the vulnerability of AC state estimation (SE) with respect to a class of unobservable state-preserving topology attacks, in which the topology data are changed by attacker while the states remain unchanged. An algorithm based on breadth-first search (BFS) is developed to determine the subset of topology data and measurements required to launch successful unobservable state-preserving topology attacks. It is shown that the proposed algorithm can enable an attacker to obtain the localized topology and corresponding measurement data to mount an attack that bypasses bad data detector and successfully changes topology information of the system in the cyber layer.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2015 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2015
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9781467373890
StatePublished - Nov 20 2015
EventNorth American Power Symposium, NAPS 2015 - Charlotte, United States
Duration: Oct 4 2015Oct 6 2015

Publication series

Name2015 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2015


OtherNorth American Power Symposium, NAPS 2015
Country/TerritoryUnited States


  • Cyber physical system security
  • breadth-first search
  • power system state and topology estimation
  • topology attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Energy Engineering and Power Technology
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Control and Systems Engineering


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