TY - JOUR
T1 - Evolution of cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma based on recognition of trustworthy and untrustworthy agents
AU - Janssen, Marcus
N1 - Funding Information:
The author thanks Daniel Stow for his help with the implementation of the computer program, and T.-K. Ahn, Jerry Busemeyer, Ryan McAllister, Lin Ostrom, Jimmy Walker, and two anonymous reviewers for useful discussions related to this article. Support from the Resilience Alliance, the National Science Foundation (SES0083511), and the European Union (contract nr. IST-2000-26016) is gratefully acknowledged.
PY - 2008/3
Y1 - 2008/3
N2 - This article explores the conditions under which agents will cooperate in one-shot two-player Prisoner's Dilemma games if they are able to withdraw from playing the game and can learn to recognize the trustworthiness of their opponents. When the agents display a number of symbols and they learn which symbols are important to estimate the trustworthiness of others, agents will evolve who cooperate in games in line with experimental observations. These results are robust to significant levels of mutations and errors made by the players.
AB - This article explores the conditions under which agents will cooperate in one-shot two-player Prisoner's Dilemma games if they are able to withdraw from playing the game and can learn to recognize the trustworthiness of their opponents. When the agents display a number of symbols and they learn which symbols are important to estimate the trustworthiness of others, agents will evolve who cooperate in games in line with experimental observations. These results are robust to significant levels of mutations and errors made by the players.
KW - Cooperation
KW - Estimating trustworthiness
KW - One-shot Prisoner's Dilemma
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.02.004
DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.02.004
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:39149134590
SN - 0167-2681
VL - 65
SP - 458
EP - 471
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
IS - 3-4
ER -