Emergence of grouping in multi-resource Minority Game dynamics

Complex systems arising in a modern society typically have many resources and strategies available for their dynamical evolutions. To explore quantitatively the behaviors of such systems, we propose a class of models to investigate Minority Game (MG) dynamics with multiple strategies. In particular, agents tend to choose the least used strategies based on available local information. A striking finding is the emergence of grouping states defined in terms of distinct strategies. We develop an analytic theory based on the mean-field framework to understand the "bifurcations" of the grouping states. The grouping phenomenon has also been identified in the Shanghai Stock-Market system, and we discuss its prevalence in other real-world systems. Our work demonstrates that complex systems obeying the MG rules can spontaneously self-organize themselves into certain divided states, and our model represents a basic and general mathematical framework to address this kind of phenomena in social, economical and political systems.