Earnings management around employee stock option reissues

Jeffrey L. Coles, Michael Hertzel, Swaminathan Kalpathy

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

77 Scopus citations


We investigate market behavior in a setting where managerial incentives to manipulate earnings and market price should be apparent ex ante to market participants. We find evidence of abnormally low discretionary accruals in the period following announcements of cancellations of executive stock options up to the time the options are reissued. Nevertheless, analysts and investors are not misled. Discretionary accruals have little power in explaining stock price performance during this period. Moreover, discretionary accruals do not explain subsequent analyst forecast errors. Thus, our findings suggest that, in this transparent setting, analysts and investors do not respond to earnings management.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)173-200
Number of pages28
JournalJournal of Accounting and Economics
Issue number1-2
StatePublished - Apr 2006


  • Capital markets
  • Discretionary accruals
  • Earnings management
  • Executive compensation
  • Stock options

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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